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TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE
The Supreme Court's initial, one sentence definition of a tying ar-
rangement-an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product-- -'
has been refined to include three necessary elements for a transaction to
be labeled a tie-in. First, the seller must have sufficient economic power
in the tying product to restrain competition in the tied product,' since the
purpose of such an arrangement is to use a seller's dominance in the pri-
mary market as leverage to better his position in the secondary market.'
Second, there must be a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate com-
merce affected.4 Thirdly, it is dear that the definition must include the
requirement that two separate products be sold. As early as the decision
in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, it was concluded that
"tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition"5 and the modern application of the tie-in doctrine has been
no less harsh on agreements that fit the tie-in form.6 The use of a tie-in
analogy to condemn the sales commission plans in the TBA case despite
their failure to conform to the classical definition, is the most notable ex-
tention of the tie-in doctrine. The tying rationale was extended again
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel.8
U.S. Steel Homes Credit Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S.
Steel, loaned money to a Louisville, Kentucky developer, for the develop-
ment of a large tract of land. The loan was made on the condition that
prefabricated houses be purchased from U.S. Steel Corp., Homes Division
and that a house be erected on each lot of the subdivision. As a matter of
form the transaction was ripe for the allegation that it was an illegal tie-in.
Credit-the tying product-was "sold" only on the condition that homes
-the tied product-also be purchased.
Despite its procedural shortcomings,' Fortner will in all likelihood be
heralded as a landmark antitrust case. The decision breaks new ground
'Northern Pa. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958).
21d. at 6.
3
,See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problea, 67 YALE LJ. 19 (1957).
4 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
5337 U.S. 293, 305-306 (1949). But see Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage
Theory 76 YALE L.J. 1939 (1967).
6 
"T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use...:' Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
7 See e.g., F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 381 U.S.
357 (1965).
8 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
9 The decision was a reversal of a summary judgment in favor of defendant U.S. Steel Corp.
See note 42 infra.
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in the area of market dominance, i.e., did U.S. Steel have sufficient eco-
nomic power in the credit market to restrain competition in the homes
market;10 and raises the more fundamental question of whether credit is
a proper tying product at all."' It is the purpose of this article however,
to explore another current tying issue considered by the Court in Fortner:
whether an alleged tie-in is actually the sale of one product conditioned
on the purchase of another or merely the sale of a single product. The
importance of determining whether the sale of a package of two or more
physically distinct articles is a single product or not is apparent. A court
determination that the items sold were in fact a unit destroys by definition
the application of a tying analysis. Conversely, if the sale of two or more
items customarily sold as a unit is determined to be a sale of separate
products, and if the dollar amount is not insubstantial, a court may be
forced to conclude that the transaction is illegal per se.1
In order to consider the contribution of Fortner, a brief sketch of a
few of the major Supreme Court decisions that developed the tying doc-
trine and how they relate to the single or separate products issue is neces-
sary. The tie-in transactions initially scrutinized by the Court involved
the attempt by a holder of a patent to tie nonpatented products to the
sale of the patented product.'3 The cases were decided not under the
antitrust laws but under the patent laws, with the remedy being denial to
the patentee who imposed tying agreements of his rights against an in-
fringer of his patent.14 Not until International Salt Co. v. United States,5
where defendant conditioned the lease of patented salt dispensing ma-
chines on the purchase of salt required for use in the machines, did the
Court conclude that tie-ins were illegal per se under the antitrust laws.16
In the patent cases the question of single or separate products was never a
problem because the patent itself defined the tying product. Note also
that the decision in International Salt was based on violations of both
section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. Fortner
was of necessity solely a Sherman Act case due to the fact that credit had
0 See 83 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1969).
"169 COLUM. L. REv. 1435 (1969).
12 Hoerner, Some Issues in Tying and Exclusive Dealing, 38 CIN L.R. 233, 242 (1969).
"If shoes and shoe strings are considered separate products, the court is forced into a tying
analysis and may find it very difficult to uphold the arrangement, despite the fact that custom
and common sense seem to suggest that the manufacture and sale of shoes with shoe strings in
them should no more be held illegal than "tying" the sale of a left shoe to a right shoe."
13 Cf. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Henery
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
14See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
't 322 U.S. 392 (1947).
16 Earlier allusions to the antitrust laws are found in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honey-
well Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944). Cf. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451 (1922).
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previously been held not to be a "commodity" as is required for the appli-
cation of section 3 of the Clayton Act.17
The two major Supreme Court cases following International Salt were
both nonpatent Sherman Act cases: Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States"8
and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.9  Like Portner, both
cases were decided under the Sherman Act since neither of the tying prod-
ucts, land and services, respectively, were "commodities." Northern Pac.
Ry. is primarily significant for its evaluation of the amount of control of
the tying market necessary to find a violation. The "sufficient economic
power" standard that was adopted represents a minimal threshold when
compared with the earlier standards, e.g. ninety-five percent control in
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States.20 Northern Pac. Ry. is repre-
sentative of the uncompromising application of per se illegality and is
the benchmark against which business justification defenses measure their
success.
It was the Times-Picayune decision, that first presented the Court's
consideration of the single or separate products issue; the decision being
based in part on a finding that only one product was involved. Defendant
publishing company controlled two of the three major newspapers in
New Orleans. In order to obtain advertising space in the morning paper,
the Times-Picayune, potential purchasers were required to also buy space in
defendant's afternoon paper, the States. In rejecting the claim that the
afternoon paper had been tied to the sale of the morning paper, the Court
held the products to be identical and the market the same.2'
Although advertising space in the Times-Picayune, as the sole morning
daily, was doubtless essential to blanket coverage of the local newspaper
readership, nothing in the record suggests that advertisers viewed the city's
newspaper readers, morning or evening, as other than fungible customer
potential. We must assume, therefore, that the readership "bought" by
advertisers in the Times-Picayune was the selfsame "product" sold by the
States and, for that matter, the Item.22
Similarly, in Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,23 the exercise
by Chrysler of its contractual rights with its dealers to choose carriers for
shipping its automobiles was challenged under the Sherman Act as an
illegal tie of transportation services to the sale of automobiles. The dis-
trict court concluded that the transaction involved the sale of a single
product with ancillary provisions for delivery.
1'7United States v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
1s 3 56 U.S. 1 (1958).
10 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
20258 U.S. 451 (1922).
21 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1952).
22 Id. at 613.
23235 . Supp. 751 (E.D. Ky. 1962), affd, 338 F.2d 934 (6 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 954 (1965).
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[lit is just as vital to Chrysler to have that car delivered in the proper
way as it is to see that it is ... properly made, and to say . . . it has en-
gaged in an unlawful enterprise, seems to be contrary to the reasonable
conception of almost, if not altogether, universal business practices.24
The approach taken by the Times-Picayune and Crawford cases would
seem to include only those cases where the two allegedly separate products
were so closely related as to be considered a unit.25
Although the same result is reached, the Times-Picayune and Crawford
line of reasoning must be segregated from the combination patent situa-
tion where the unity of the package of products is defined by law. Most
patented products are unique combinations of unpatented products or
materials. Thus where a patentee is the holder of a patent for a com-
plete system there is no tie-in of the component parts of that system, even
though the same parts may be or are sold individually. This is because
the patentee is only exercising the power confered on him by statute.20
Reasoning of this kind becomes crucial in a typical franchise arrangement.
There is the danger that a tying analysis may be invoked if the trade-
mark or copyright that is licensed is treated as a separate product from
the related articles or goods used by the franchisee. To avoid this problem
courts have been willing to hold the conglomeration of legal rights and
physical goods to be a single product:27 "llt is conceptually impossible
. . . to view a license to use a trademark as separate and distinct from
the sale of the trademarked product or its ingredient."2
A second approach to solving the single product issue concerns prod-
ucts that dearly are physically distinct. They may be sold separately and
there is no combination patent to protect the sale of the package as a unit.
A defendant may nevertheless argue that market circumstances require
sale as a unit. This line of reasoning is best represented by United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp.29 At the inception of commercial television
Jerrold Electronics Corp. had developed an unpatented television antenna
system capable of reaching remote geographical areas that conventional
apparatus could not. Because the system was innovative and untested
numerous failures resulted from improper installation and maintenance.
To avoid the problem Jerrold Electronics adopted a policy of conditioning
the sale of new systems on (1) an acceptance by the buyer of a service
241d. at 755.
25 For general discussion of the "single product defense," see, Austin, The Tying Arrange-
ment: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, at 116.
26 See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 50, 69. "If the patent statute means anything it means that the patent defines the
"product" and that the sale of that "product" is not a tie-in in the legal sense."
2 7 Hoerner, supra note 12 at 243.
2 8 Carvel Corp., 1965-1967 Transfer Binder TRADE REG. REP. 517,298 (FTC 1965). For
copyright, see Cardinal Films, Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 148 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
29 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). (noted in 49
CALF. I. REV. 746 (1961) and 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961)).
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contract and (2) a mandatory purchase of the entire system in order to
insure proper servicing. The government attacked the tie-in of the service
contracts under section 1 of the Sherman Act and the requirement that the
full system be purchased under section 3 of the Clayton Act. Although
the court questioned30 whether a single product was involved, a general
criterion for resolving the issue was formulated: "The facts must be exam-
ined to ascertain whether or not there are legitimate reasons for selling
normally separate items in a combined form to dispel any inferences that
it is really a disguised tie-in." 31
The "legitimate reasons" philosophy of Jerrold was given vitality in
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp. 2  "We think the principle
recognized by the district court in Jerrold, that a proper business reason
may justify what might otherwise be an unlawful tie-in, is sound." 33
Unlike Jerrold Electronics, which was a fledgling company, the defendant
in Dehydrating Process was an established manufacturer of silos and un-
loading equipment. After many years of receiving customer complaints
arising from the use of competitors unloaders with defendant's silos, Dehy-
drating Process Co. adopted a policy whereby unloaders were only installed
if the purchaser already owned or was presently buying a Dehydrating
silo. The Court cited the continued malfunctioning of the products de-
spite attempts to educate customers and the resultant damage to reputation
as sufficient business justifications for defendant's policies.34  The signif-
icance of the Jerrold and Dehydrating Process cases stems from the fact
that market exigencies may be considered at the product definition level.
If a single product characterization results, the harsh per se illegality
treatment required by Northern Pac. RyY5 may be circumvented without
having to carve out an exception to the uncompromising language of that
opinion.
Such was the state of the single product issue prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.36 Plain-
tiff, Fortner Enterprises Inc. (hereinafter Fortner) wished to purchase and
develop a large tract of land on which it planned to construct homes.
In order to do so it secured a loan from U.S. Steel Homes Credit Corpora-
30 
"T]he defendants' position would seem to be highly questionable." Id. at 560. Four
factors gave rise to the courts doubt: "Others who entered the community antenna field offered
all of the equipment necessary for a complete system, but none of them sold their gear exclusively
as a single package ... [Hardly any two versions of the alleged product were the same. [T~he
customer was charged for each item of equipment and not a lump sum for the total system.
Finally, while Jerrold had cable and antennas to sell which were manufactured by other con-
cerns, it only required that the electronic equipment in the system be brought from it." Id. at 559.
3 1 1d. at 559.
32 292 F.2d 653, (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
33 Id. at 655.
34 292 F.2d at 656.
3r 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
30 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
19701
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion (hereinafter Credit Corporation), a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S.
Steel Corp. The amount of the loan was approximately $2,000,000 of
which $300,000 was used to purchase and develop the land. The re-
mainder was used to purchase prefabricated houses from U.S. Steel, Homes
Division (hereinafter Homes Division). The loan agreement provided
that the financing would be available only on the condition that Homes
Division's prefabricated houses be erected on each lot of the subdivision.
The agreement further provided that the obligation to buy houses would
cease whenever the loan was repaid. When some of the houses erected
proved to be defective, Fortner sued, seeking an injunction preventing en-
forcement of the obligation to purchase and lost profits because of the
defects and unreasonably high prices of the houses. Plaintiff's complaint
alleged an illegal tie-in under section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 7 Defendant,
U.S. Steel Corp., was granted summary judgment in the district court, 8
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed without opinion. 9 In a five to four deci-
sion the Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was
improper because the pleadings and affidavits raised an issue of fact.
Under the "legitimate reasons" test of Jerrold the Fortner facts lend
themselves to a single product construction. The nature of the legitimacy
test dearly requires a factual determination in each case, yet the factual
basis of majority opinion in Fortner for finding the existence of separate
products is questionable. Justice Black, writing for the majority, first
concedes that it may be impossible to separate credit from the product
sold where there is a typical sale with credit terms by a single seller.40
He distinguishes the present transaction from the typical credit sale by the
existence of two facts: (1) Credit Corporation and Homes Division were
separate corporations, and (2) the amount loaned exceded the amount
needed to purchase the houses.41  Although these facts are not discussed
directly in terms of legitimacy, an earlier part of the opinion indicates that
on remand "[ilt may turn out that the arrangement involved here serves
legitimate business purposes .... ,,42 If the language is an instruction to
3 7 Former also alleged a conspiracy to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
38 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
39 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968).
40 394 U.S. 495, 507. Justice Black also indicates that the legality of credit sales is not de-
termined here. "It will be time enough to pass on the issue of credit sales when a case involv-
ing it actually arises." Id.
41id. at 507.
42Id. at 506. The ambiguity over this point is brought out in the dissent by Ir. Justice
Fortas.
"At another point the majority even suggests that if U.S. Steel can show 'legitimate
business purposes' and the absence of 'competitive advantage" (ante, at 506) in the
credit market, it will have made out a defense. But in an earlier part of the opinion,
the majority says explicitly that 'it is dear that petitioner raised questions of fact
which, if proved at trial, would bring this tying arrangement within the scope of the
per se doctrine' (ante, at 500-501)." Id. atn. 524.




the trial court to consider valid business purposes in connection with the
single product issue, U.S. Steel has substantial arguments in favor of the
proposition that one product, not two, were sold.43
It is not an uncommon practice for manufacturers and suppliers to
finance their dealers or retailers, and in almost every case the financing is
conditioned on the purchase of their goods.44 Such an arrangement pro-
vides for the simplification of transaction by eliminating a financial insti-
tution as intermediary. Also, because the purchaser-dealer is a source of
future income to the seller-lender, there is an added inducement to extend
credit to new venturers when the risks are too high for conventional
lenders. Fortner Enterprises was a new business and there was testimony
to show that most of Credit Corporation's borrowers were not prime finan-
cial risks 5 Furthermore, the fact that the loan here was for more than
the price of the houses is not fatal to the argument. It is also not an un-
common practice for the seller-lender to finance such fixtures, displays or
other assets that are necessary for the retailer to dispense seller's goods
and that cannot be financed through conventional lenders.
A holding on the single product issue contrary to that of the majority
in Fortner may also be defended under the Times-Picayune and Crawford
line of reasoning. Credit Corporation made its financing available solely
to franchised dealer-builders of the Homes Division and solely for the
purpose of constructing Homes Division houses.40 Where such is the case,
as opposed to a general purpose financial institution the primary function
of which is lending, there is considerable merit to the proposition that
the items are so functionally related as to constitute the sale of a single
product, i.e., the sale of homes with an ancillary financing provision 7
similar to the incidental delivery services in Crawford.
The kind of transaction condemned in Fortner may well be the very
kind of price competition that the Sherman Act was enacted to encourage.
Such a conclusion admittedly requires an expansive reading of a reversal of
a summary judgment as well as nonrecognition of the potential threat
that tying of products to credit may have to legitimate antitrust interests
(all four of the dissenting judges conceded that the tie of products to credit
might run afoul of the antitrust laws). Yet it brings into focus what
may be the most fundamental weakness of the Fortner approach: the will-
ingness to apply the "extraordinary onerous incidents of per se illegality"
4 3 It is doubtful whether such an option is open to the trial court in light of the following
language: "we cannot see how an arrangement such as that present in this case could ever be
said to involve only a single product." Id. at 507.
4 4 See generally Brief for Respondent at 49-53.
45 Brief for Respondent at 6.
40 Id. at 5.
47 It was the conclusion of Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent that there was a sale of a single product
with incidental financing provisions. 394 U.S. 495,523 (1968).
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to this type of arrangement.4" Application of the per se rule dearly has
the advantage of ease of administration due to the fact that the blanket
prohibition of Northern Pac. Ry. requires no consideration of market
structure or practical business justifications. It is equally dear, however,
that the same doctrine works injustice when applied to situations not
precisely the same as those that gave rise to the doctrine. The loan
arguments made by Credit Corporation are a far cry from the attempts of
the earlier patentees to extend their statutory monopolies into other mar-
kets. The Fortner decision applies a cure that is disproportionate to the
evil it seeks to correct. Determination that a single product has been
sold is a useful tool for exempting certain transactions that are supported
by legitimate business considerations from the harsh application of North-
emn Pac. Ry. The finding is especially appropriate where alternative meth-
ods of protecting antitrust interests, such as section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act or section 2 of the Clayton Act, are available. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. is such a case.
John Lahey
48 Id.
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